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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The probate court entered an Amended Final Judgment on 
September 26, 2000. Notice of Appeal was filed October 17, 2000. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE ONE 
There is no statutory basis for the award of attorney's fees under 
the Utah Uniform Probate Code, and the award should be reversed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW This matter of statutory construction 
presents an issue of law which the appellate court considers de novo. The 
appellate court gives no deference to the trial court on such a question of law, 
but is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). The appellate court reviews the trial 
court's legal conclusions for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am.r Inc.. 
814P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
WHERE ISSUE PRESERVED IN TEE PROBATE COURT. On 
February 4, 1997, the personal representative filed "The Estate's Objection to 
and Disallowance of Request for Costs and for Attorney's Fees" arguing that 
the Utah Uniform Probate Code contains no provision for an award of 
attorney's fees in a proceeding to determine an heir, and that only costs can 
be claimed. (R. 664) 
ISSUE TWO 
The probate court failed to enter findings of fact to support the 
large award of attorney's fees, and the case should be remanded for 
entry of findings of fact sufficient to facilitate review on appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW The threshold question of whether the trial 
court's findings of fact in support of an attorney's fee award are sufficiently 
detailed to facilitate appellate review is a question of law as to which the 
appellate court gives no deference to the trial court. The absence of such 
adequate findings of fact that are sufficiently detailed "precludes appellate 
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review of the evidentiary basis underlying the trial court's decision and 
requires remand for more detailed findings by the trial court." Matter of the 
Estate of Ouinn. 830 P.2d 282 (Utah App. 1992). 
WHERE ISSUE PRESERVED FN THE PROBA TE COURT On 
February 1, 1997, the estate filed "The Estate's Objection to Two Proposed 
Orders" in which the personal representative argued that the $41,212,50 
attorney's fee claim "appears excessive, was not raised at trial, and there is no 
showing that Mr. Steffensen's client's are liable to him for the fees." (R. 656) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UCA Sec. 75-2-109 (1992) [Addendum] 
UCA Sec. 75-2-114(1998) [Addendum] 
UCA Sec 78-45a (1994) [Addendum] 
UCA Sec 78-45a (1997) [Addendum] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Kristie Madsen filed a petition to have her daughter Karly Madsen 
declared to be an heir. Later Karly Madsen appeared on her own behalf. 
The matter was finally settled through stipulated court-ordered DNA 
testing, with all parties accepting the results. The probate court awarded 
Karly Madsen $41,212.50 in attorney's fees over the estate's objection that 
the award was without statutory basis and that the award was excessive. 
FACTS 
1. Kory Pasquin died on October 26, 1996, at the age of 28 years, 
while domiciled in Salt Lake County. (R. 1) 
2. As of the date of his death, only one child, Tori Lynn Pasquin, was 
listed in the official birth records as his child. No other children were listed 
in any official birth record or other official record as his children. (R.2) 
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3. Candance M. Souter, the mother of Tori Lynn Pasquin, was 
appointed personal representative of The Estate of Kory Pasquin by the Hon. 
Tyrone E. Medley, Salt Lake County Probate Judge, on March 4, 1997. (R.8) 
4. (>n April 21. Il>97 one knslic Miulsen Ilk' mother of Karly Yvette 
Madsen, filed a petition claiming that Kristie Madsen had "a property right in 
or a claim against the decedent's estate individually and on behalf of her 
inmoi child wlin is iilsiMleu'deiil1, ininoi child " ll'1 II) 
5. On May 12, 1997, the personal representative filed a response to 
that petition and filed official birth certificates showing that Kory Pasquin 
was listed as the father on the birth certificate asquin dated 
February n» : 994, but was not listed as the father in the birth certificate of 
• - .- .- N ) 
6. On May 14, 1997, the Hon. Tyrone E. Medley heard the petition 
and referred it to the trial calendar of the Hon. Leslie Lewis. (R.38) 
mother Kristie Madsen when she filed the subject petition dated April 21, 
1997, filed a "Petitioner's Trial Brief in which they asserted that the minor 
child Karlv *^ vettc Madsen was now the petitioner and that .;u-\ • c*. •. < 
attorneys. In that trial brief, said attorneys conceded that "(t)he sole factual 
issue at trial is whether Karly Yvette Madsen is Kory Pasquin's child." (R. 
440) They further conceded that "(t)he petitioner, Karly Madsen, bears the 
initial burden of proof in establishing that Kory Pasquin is her father. The 
sLinddiil ill |iniiil in nuking ihiii ik'li'imm.iliiiii i • 'In cleai ami UHI\ inung 
proof U.C.A. Section 75-2-109(2)(b)."(R. 440) They further conceded 
that "(gtenetic test evidence must be based on a proper evidentiary foundation 
showing that appropriate procedures were established and routinely followed 
to assure reliability in the performance of the tests, chain of custody, etc." (R. 
444) (underlined emphasis appears in original trial brief as filed). On that 
same date, they also filed a "Petitioner's Motion in Limine" in which they 
indicated they intended to introduce the results of some non-court-ordered 
DNA testing that had been conducted prior to Kory Pasquin's death. (R.411) 
8. On January 26, 1998, the personal representative filed a response to 
said motion in limine within her "Consolidated Response to Pending Trial 
and Discovery Motions" in which she argued "(s)ince children born out of 
wedlock had no right to inherit under the common law, any right of a child 
born out of wedlock to inherit from the father is a statutory creation and 
applicable statutory procedure must be followed. The applicable procedure is 
found at UCA Sec. 78-45a-10 (July 1, 1997) That procedure requires a party 
to file a motion and obtain a court order prior to genetic testing." (R. 501) 
9. Rather than seeking and obtaining a court-ordered DNA test, 
petitioner Karly Madsen elected to proceed with non-court-ordered DNA test, 
results arguing in a filing dated January 30, 1998, that "(a) genetic test was in 
fact performed in March of 1996 involving the decedent, Karly Madsen, and 
her mother, Kristie Madsen. If the appropriate tests for admissibility can be 
met . . . the genetic test will be admissible." (R. 511) 
10. Based on Karly Madsen's stated intent to proceed with non-court-
ordered DNA test results rather than seeking and obtaining a court-ordered 
DNA test, the personal representative gave notice that if Karly Madsen 
elected to proceed with the non-court-ordered DNA test results rather than 
obtaining a court-ordered DNA test, the personal representative would 
oppose an award of attorney's fees. "The personal representative has both the 
right and the duty to put (Karly Madsen's counsel) to his proof. . . . Instead 
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of simplv ohliiinirij.'. a -undated by statute (Karly 
Madsen's counsel) has done everything he can to get around and avoid the 
statute." (Memorandum of the Estate in Opposition to Karly Madsen's 
Motion loi \llomev\ I ce>. 1 cbman 6 IWX) (K S27) 
11. On November 18, 1998, the Hon. Leslie A. Lewis entered an order 
providing that "the admissibility of non-court ordered . . . genetic test results 
that Petitioner Karly Madsen seeks to admil mle e\ ulenee in the trial oi thr 
matter, will be governed by the normal and usual tests for the admissibility of 
such evidence . . . (K (ill (I 
12. At the trial of this case, petitioner failed to call any foundation 
outpatient laboratory witness who could testify that he or she drew blood 
evidence. Instead, the petitioner called a testing laboratory physician who 
had received a blood sample from an outpatient laboratory over whom he had 
no supervisory responsibility, who testified "I1 m 11oI .11c\i1111A|>CI l hul IIIN 
understanding of the chain of custody requirements are so that you can trust 
want to make sure that a sample has been in proper custody the entire time. 
For instance, in a criminal investigation, if a sample was found at a crime 
scene that lln.1 .ample i nuM Iv accounted leu limn the lime the pohee officer 
or detective picked it up to the time it eventually got tested by the forensic 
laboratory. In normal medical testing we don't trace a blood sample through 
as carefully as we do when it is a court ordered test" (T. 253, emphasis 
added) When this testing physician was asked whether "at the time this '96 
test was performed there was no court order that a test be done9" he 
responded "That's correct." (T. 307) 
-6-
13. When counsel for petitioner began referring to the non-court-
ordered DNA test results without first calling any foundation witness from 
the outpatient laboratory who could testify that he or she drew blood from the 
late Kory Pasquin and then forwarded them to the testing laboratory (for 
purposes of establishing a chain of custody of evidence) (and prior to the 
admission of those test results into evidence), counsel for the personal 
representative objected, and the court secured a commitment from counsel 
for petitioner that he would tie it up later. However, counsel for petitioner 
failed to call such a foundation witness from the outpatient laboratory, and 
the physician who had performed the test testified (as to such a potential "tie-
up" witness) "I am not their direct supervisor, and my supervisory power, or 
whatever, is only that of a contractor. I mean, somebody who is buying 
services from the outpatient laboratory and that they're providing those for 
us." At that point, counsel for the personal representative again objected: 
"Your Honor, briefly, with all due respect to (counsel for petitioner) I didn't 
see anyone on his witness list that would be able to tie this up later and so I 
am a little concerned about having this witness read something that is not 
going to be tied up later." At that point, a bench conference was held at the 
conclusion of which counsel for petitioner moves to another subject (T. 263) 
14. Even though counsel for Karly Madsen failed to call a foundation 
witness from the outpatient laboratory to testify that he or she drew blood 
from the late Kory Pasquin (for purposes of establishing a chain of custody 
of evidence), the trial court allowed the DNA test results into evidence 
without such a foundation witness, over the estate's objection. (T. 272) The 
trial jury decided the factual issue of whether Karly Yvette Madsen is Kory 
Pasquin's child and heir in favor of paternity and heirship. (R. 636). 
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15. Even though Karly Madsen had identified the question of "whether 
Karly Yvette Madsen is Kory Pasquin's child" as the "sole factual issue at 
trial" and even though there was no finding at the trial that the number of 
heirs was limited to two heirs, Karly Madsen mailed a proposed "Final 
Judgement" on January 22, 1999, providing that Karly Madsen was "entitled 
to one-half of the Kory Pasquin's intestate estate" together with attorney's fees 
and costs, interest on such attorney's fees and costs, plus petitioner's 
attorney's fees and costs in "collecting" the said judgment. (R. 678) On 
January 26, 1998, Karly Madsen's counsel filed an affidavit claiming 
attorney's fees in the sum of $41,212.50. 
16. The estate filed a timely objection on February 1, 1999, pointing 
out that "(w)hether or not Karly Madsen is entitled to one-half of the estate 
turns on whether any more claimants come forward claiming to have had a 
child fathered by the late Kory Pasquin. That issue was not resolved at trial 
and no ruling was made a trial limiting the late Kory Pasquin's children to 
two." The estate also indicated in the same filing that it opposed the claim of 
attorney's fees as excessive and without legal basis and would file a separate 
paper objecting to and disallowing the attorney's fee claim. (R. 656). 
17. Three-days later, on February 4, 1999, the estate timely filed "The 
Estate's Objection to and Disallowance of Request for Costs and for 
Attorney's Fees" in which the estate argued that the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code contains no provision for an award of attorney's fees in a proceeding to 
determine an heir, and that only costs can be claimed. (R. 664) 
18. Said "Final Judgement" was entered on March 2, 1999, over the 
estate's objection, providing that Karly Madsen was "entitled to one-half of 
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the Kory Pasquin's intestate estate" together with attorney's fees and costs, 
interest on such attorney's fees and costs, plus petitioner's attorney's fees and 
costs in "collecting" the said judgment. (R. 678) 
19. The estate filed a notice of appeal on March 31, 1999. (R. 686) 
20. On April 29, 1999, Sheri Marion, the natural mother of Kody Jon 
Marion, filed a "Petition for Determination of Additional Heirs and Demand 
for Notice" asserting that her child was a third child and heir. (R. 695) 
21. On May 19, 1999, Karly Madsen filed an "Objection to 
Determination of Additional Heirs and Objection to the Entry of Any Order 
Determining Kody Jon Marion to be an Additional Heir of Kory Pasquin and 
His Estate" in which Karly Madsen argued that the court had "entered a Final 
Judgment on Karly Madsen's claim of paternity wherein the Court decreed 
that Karly Madsen is an heir of the Decedent's estate and accordingly is 
entitled to one-half of the Decedent's Estate (with the other one-half going to 
Tory Lynn Pasquin)." (R. 708) 
22. On May 25, 1999, the estate filed an objection to the petition of 
Sheri Marion based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, since the case 
was on appeal of a final order. "The estate timely objected to that final order 
in the trial court on the ground that there might be other heirs. The Marion 
petition so claims. An appeal of the final order was timely taken by the 
estate. The estate will urge reversal on appeal based, inter alia, on that same 
ground." (R. 711). On August 11, 1999, the trial court declined to exercise 
jurisdiction, writing in a minute entry that "it is decided that until the Court 
of Appeals has the final order on the case, this court will not take further 
action." (R. 797) On August 24, 1999, the trial court entered an order 
awarding attorney's fees in the sum of $41,212.50 to Karly Madsen. (R. 803) 
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23. On January 3, 2000, counsel for the personal representative, 
counsel for Karly Madsen, and counsel for Sheri Marion filed a stipulation 
prepared by counsel for Sheri Marion and signed by all of them. (R. 809). 
24. On January 3, 2000, counsel for the personal representative, 
counsel for Karly Madsen, and counsel for Sheri Marion filed a joint motion 
for court-ordered DNA testing. (R. 811) 
25. On January 11, 2000, Judge Leslie A. Lewis signed an order for 
court-ordered DNA testing. (R. 813) 
26. On March 16, 2000, the estate filed a motion to dismiss the appeal 
"without prejudice". Karly Madsen responded with a memorandum on 
March 31, 2000, that the appeal should be dismissed "with prejudice". The 
estate filed a reply on April 4, 2000, that the appeal should be dismissed 
"without prejudice" on the ground, inter alia, that the "Final Judgement" 
entered on March 2, 1999, was interlocutory in nature, even though it was 
styled as a "Final Judgement" on its face. The Supreme Court granted the 
motion to dismiss the appeal "without prejudice" on April 18, 2000. (R. 820) 
27. On June 15, 2000, upon receiving the results of the DNA testing 
ordered by the court on January 11, 2000, the estate filed "Estate of Kory 
Pasquin's Notice of DNA Test Results and Recognition of Heirs" in which 
the estate gave notice that said court ordered DNA testing had established 
that Karly Madsen and Kody Marion were children of the late Kory Pasquin 
and that Sheri Marion is the child of and that based on this DNA test as to 
Karly Madsen and Kody Marion and "public records of live births" as to Tory 
Pasquin, that Tory Pasquin, Kody Marion, and Karly Madsen are children 
and heirs of the late Kory Pasquin." (R. 842) 
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28. On June 28, 2000, the Hon. Leslie A. Lewis entered an order 
providing that "(p)ursuant to the stipulation of the parties on file herein and 
the notice filed by the estate on June 15, 2000, recognizing three (3) persons 
as heirs, the court, being sufficiently advised" all prior orders awarding half 
of the estate to Karly Madsen were stricken and "there being an unresolved 
issue of law" over attorney's fees, no such award is made "at this time 
without prejudice to the right to raise and fully brief the issue." (R. 860) 
29. On July 27, 2000, Judge Leslie A. Lewis made a minute entry 
order vacating her order of June 28, 2000. (R. 937). 
30. On September 26, 2000, Judge Leslie A. Lewis entered an 
"Amended Final Judgment". (R. 971). On October 17, 2000, the estate 
timely filed a notice of appeal of the amended final judgment entered on 
September 26, 2000, "and all prior attorneys' fee and cost orders". (R. 860) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
• There is no statutory basis for the attorney's fee award below. 
• The case should be remanded for failure to make findings of fact. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
There is no statutory basis for the award of attorney's fees under 
the Utah Uniform Probate Code, and the award should be reversed. 
Kristie Madsen filed her petition to have her daughter Karly Madsen 
determined to be an heir on April 21, 1997. The applicable probate code 
provision effective on that date appeared at UCA 75-2-109 (1992), a copy of 
which is annexed hereto. That provision provided that paternity must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence, but it did not contain any 
provision for attorney's fees, nor did it contain any reference to the Uniform 
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Act on Paternity appearing at Chapter 45a of Title 78 (1994) of the Utah 
Code. The trial of Kristie Madsen's petition was scheduled for January 26, 
1998. Trial preparation was done with an eye on that date, including, but not 
limited trial subpoena service and return of service by the estate. (R. 489) 
Ten calendar days before that trial date, on January 16, 1998, the 
pretrial was held. (R. 487) Due to a conflict in the court's calendar, the court 
ordered the trial continued for four months to May 26, 1998. The court 
entered and mailed an order (R. 486) on January 20, 1998, continuing the 
trial to May 26, 1998. As the parties had already prepared for trial and 
pretried the case on January 16, 1998, the judge ruled "(n)o further pretrial is 
needed." (R. 487) Between January 16, 1998, and May 22, 1998, motion, 
discovery, and other issues were addressed. ((R. 487 through R. 575) 
On May 22, 1998, a scheduling conference was held in which the 
court continued the May 26, 1998, trial date to September 1, 1998. (R. 576) 
There were no further court filings after May 22, 1998, through July 1, 
1998. Effective July 1, 1998, the Utah Uniform Probate code was amended. 
The new applicable probate code provision effective on that date 
appeared at UCA 75-2-114 (1998), a copy of which is annexed hereto. 
That new applicable provision also did not contain any provision for 
attorney's fees, but it did contain a reference to the Uniform Act on Paternity, 
appearing at Chapter 45a of Title 78 (1997) of the Utah Code. Thus, from 
the time that Kristie Madsen filed her petition on April 21, 1997 (R. 11), until 
the law was changed effective July 1, 1998, there was no basis in the Utah 
. Uniform Probate Code for an attorney's fee award. There was no basis for an 
award after that date unless the court construes the reference from the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code to the Uniform Act on Paternity to incorporate an 
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attorney's fee provision by reference. This presents an issue of first 
impression in Utah. Furthermore, the petition filed by Kristie Madsen on 
April 21, 1997, did not pray for attorney's fees. Interestingly, Kristie Madsen 
continued to participate in this probate until August 14, 1997, the last date on 
which she filed something on behalf of her daughter. (R. 74). Without 
explanation, on August 27, 1997, her attorney, David W. Steffensen, caused 
a paper to be filed in which he indicated he was counsel for both Kristie 
Madsen and Karly Madsen. (R. 82). Then, on August 29, 1997, again 
without explanation to the court or to the personal representative, David W. 
Steffensen began signing papers as attorney for Karly Madsen only. (R. 84). 
On January 16, 1998, Karly Madsen filed a motion for attorney's fees 
pursuant to UCA Sec. 78-45a-5(4). (R. 404) As set forth above, the 
applicable Utah Uniform Probate Code provision then in effect contained no 
reference to the Uniform Act on Paternity at Chapter 45 a of Title 78. 
Accordingly, none of the attorney's fees incurred by Kristie Madsen 
from April 21, 1997, through August 14, 1997, should be awarded to Karly 
Madsen. None of Karly Madsen's attorney's fees incurred by her between 
August 14, 1997, and July 1, 1998, should be awarded to her because there 
was no statutory basis for same in effect during that period of time or in 
effect when she filed her motion for attorney's fees on January 16, 1998. 
As far as attorney's fees incurred by Karly Madsen from and after July 
1, 1998, the court should rule that the reference in the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code to the Uniform Act on Paternity should not be construed to incorporate 
a fee-shifting provision by reference, since, on a matter of such importance, 
the legislature would have placed the fee-shifting provision in the applicable 
portion of the Utah Uniform Probate Code itself had it intended to do this. 
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If the court construes a fee-shifting provision by reference, then no 
award of attorney's fees should be made, because no motion for attorney's 
fees was filed after the change in the law on July 1, 1998, provided a basis. 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, the attorney fee award should 
be reversed as having no basis in law or in the record. If the court construes 
a fee-shifting provision by reference and also concludes that Karly Madsen is 
entitled to a fee award under this record, no fees should be awarded for fees 
incurred prior to July 1, 1998, the date the law changed. If the court decides 
the change in law was retroactive, no fees should be awarded for fees 
incurred during the period of time prior to the date Kristie Madsen filed her 
motion for attorney's on January 16, 1998, the date of the pretrial conference. 
This is significant, since trial preparation was already so complete on 
January 16, 1998, that the probate court ruled that no further pretrial was 
needed, and since this was the date on which the estate first received notice 
by court filing that Karly Madsen was seeking attorney's fees. 
The fee award of $41,212.50 should be reversed and remanded for 
entry by the trial court of an award consistent with the appellate court's 
rulings on the law, and in any event, the fee award of $41,212.50 should be 
reversed and remanded for entry by the trial court of findings of fact that are 
sufficient to facilitate appellate review of the reasonableness of the fee. 
POINT TWO 
The probate court failed to enter findings of fact to support the 
large award of attorney's fees, and the case should be remanded for 
entry of findings of fact sufficient to facilitate review on appeal. 
The threshold question of whether the trial court's findings of fact in 
support of an attorney's fee award are sufficiently detailed and include 
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enough subsidiary facts to facilitate appellate review is a question of law as 
to which the appellate court gives no deference to the trial court. In resolving 
a dispute over an attorney's fee award, the trial court should have made and 
entered findings that are sufficiently detailed and that include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose to the appellate court the manner in which the 
trial court applied the following four-step process: 1) Determination of 
"exactly" what legal work the petitioning attorney performed both in terms of 
the nature of the work and the time spent in its performance; 2) 
Determination of "how much of that work was reasonably necessary" to 
adequately conclude the representation; 3) Determination of the 
reasonableness of the hourly rate charged; and 4) Finally, after a "preliminary 
fee" has been established by applying the first three steps, the court should 
then apply the various criteria that are set forth in Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.5- Fees. The absence of adequate findings of fact that are 
sufficiently detailed and that include enough subsidiary facts to disclose to 
the appellate court the steps by which the trial court applied, analyzed, and 
then resolved each one of these four requirements "precludes appellate review 
of the evidentiary basis underlying the trial court's decision and requires 
remand for more detailed findings by the trial court." Matter of the Estate of 
Quinnr 830 P.2d 282 (Utah App. 1992). 
The award of $41,212.50 appears excessive on its face and the estate 
objected to it as appearing excessive. Yet, the trial court entered no findings 
of fact supporting such a large fee award. This leaves both the personal 
representative and the appellate court unable to evaluate whether the award is 
reasonable. A remand for more detailed findings of fact will allow the 
personal representative to evaluate those findings in order to determine 
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whether or not she should seek further appellate review, and, if so, to pursue 
such further appellate review in a manner that is consistent with her fiduciary 
duties and in a manner reasonably calculated to benefit the estate. 
It appears that preparing for and trying a paternity claim where one 
already has a DNA test in-hand should cost no more than $5,000, not 
$41,212.50. This high award occurred when the court awarded fees that 
were not incurred in pursuing the heirship claim, but were incurred in filings 
by Karly Madsen and Kristie Madsen pertaining to estate administration, not 
heirship, which were never litigated to a conclusion. There was no statutory 
basis for awarding these non-heirship fees, or, in the alternative, since they 
were never litigated to a conclusion, there was no factual and legal basis for 
designation of a prevailing party to whom attorney's fees could be awarded. 
As set forth above, there were a number of filings related to estate 
administration initiated by Karly Madsen and Kristie Madsen as to which no 
court determination was ever made. There were other matters related to heirs 
as to which Karly Madsen initially prevailed but later did not prevail (such as 
her insistence that she was entitled to half of the estate). A fee award under a 
statute should only be awarded for those matters litigated to a conclusion via 
judicial decision in which the party claiming the award ultimately prevailed. 
Attorney's fees incurred or expended on matters which were not 
concluded by a judicial determination should not be awarded under a fee-
shifting statute. Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia, No. 
99-1848 (U.S. Supreme Court, May 30, 2001). "A defendant's voluntary 
change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought 
to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the 
change" (Rehnquist, C.J.) "One does not prevail in a suit that is never 
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determined." (Scalia, J., concurring.) These principles are especially 
applicable in this case, where the prolix filings by Karly Madsen and Kristie 
Madsen related to estate administration rather than Karly Madsen's status as 
an heir never resulted in a judicial determination and where most of the 
heirship issues were ultimately settled rather than judicially decided. Further, 
the "Final Judgement" which provided the basis for the award of $41,212.50 
erroneously provided that Karly Madsen was entitled to one-half of the estate, 
even though no determination had been made that there were only two heirs. 
The court later entered an "Amended Final Judgement" that recognized 
three heirs and did not foreclose the possibility of even more children to be 
recognized as additional heirs in the future. Yet, the trial court applied "law 
of the case" to reinstate the earlier $41,212.50 that it had vacated, even 
though there had been this subsequent change and Karly Madsen no longer 
prevailed on that point. Based on this change in the operative facts, the 
doctrine of "law of the case" should not have been applied and the court 
should either have modified the $41,212.50 or entered findings of fact 
justifying the absence of modification in light of the change in facts. 
As set forth Matter of the Estate of Quinn, 830 P.2d 282 (Utah App. 
1992), the reasonableness of the fee must be weighed against the overall 
amount involved, pursuant to Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 - Fees. 
While the personal representative has been successful in defending the 
estate against lawsuits and claims in which third parties either claimed 
ownership of a significant portion of estate property or asserted personal 
injury claims arising out of the boating accident at Lake Powell in which 
Kory Pasquin was killed, the personal representative has, so far, been unable 
to get this $41,212.50 attorney's fee award reversed, and it is so large that it 
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now predominates this entire probate. Absent a finding by the trial court of 
the value of the property left by Kory Pasquin, no measure can be made of 
the reasonableness of that $41,212.50 fee claim against the amount involved. 
This raises another matter in which the trial court's failure to enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law thwarts evaluation of the award by 
the personal representative and appellate review. The personal representative 
must distribute estate assets in the following order under UCA Sec. 75-3-805: 
(a) reasonable funeral expenses; 
(b) costs and expenses of administration; 
(c) debts and taxes with preference under federal law; 
(d) medical and hospital expenses of the last illness; 
(e) debts and taxes with preference under the laws of this state; 
(f) all other claims; 
(g) a pro rata distribution of the remainder to the three heirs identified 
so far plus any additional children of Kory Pasquin who may be identified. 
The absence of detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law creates 
confusion as to whether the $41,212.50 is to be paid under (f) ahead of the 
distribution to the heirs or is, instead, to be paid in conjunction with a pro 
rata distribution to the heirs under (g), since it is going to an heir and since it 
is being awarded in connection with a determination of that heir's heirship. 
The $41,212.50 should be reversed and remanded for entry of detailed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law indicating whether the fee award, if 
any, is to be paid by the personal representative under (f) or under (g). 
There has also been no finding (or any showing on which to base such 
a finding) that if the $41,212.50 is not awarded against the estate assets, then 
Karly Madsen's attorneys will take this out of her share of the estate to satisfy 
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their claim against her for attorney's fees or that she will otherwise be liable 
to them for the $41,212.50. This is significant, since actual liability on the 
part of the client and an actual expectation by the attorney that he or she will 
collect from the client serves as a healthy check and balance against incurring 
excessive fees. Such a check and balance is not present if the attorney is 
taking the case on a flier with an expectation that he will not be paid unless 
he can get an attorney's fee award from the other side. In that case, neither 
the attorney nor the client have an incentive to keep the fees reasonable. 
Once the matter is remanded to the trial court and that court makes 
detailed findings of fact, it is possible that the trial court will use that exercise 
to weed-out all of Karly Madsen and Kristie Madsen's fees for litigation they 
initiated related to estate administration (which they never concluded and as 
to which there is not even a colorable statutory basis for a fee award) from 
fees that relate to determination of heirship. The heirship fees should not 
amount to all that much. There were already DNA test results on file at the 
University of Utah that related to Kory Pasquin. When the University of 
Utah's counsel resisted Kristie Madsen's subpoena duces tecum to get those 
test results, the personal representative joined with Kristie Madsen in a joint 
motion for an order for their release to counsel for both sides. (R. 84) 
Once those records were released, it appeared that there were flaws 
that made them less than "clear and convincing" and a legal issue arose as to 
whether non-court-ordered DNA test results were entitled to the deference 
granted under UCA Sec. 75-2-114 (1998) where the standard of proof is 
clear and convincing evidence, when, pursuant to UCA Sec. 78-45a-6.5 
(1997), such deference should be given only where a preponderance standard 
is being applied. Via filings with the court related to that issue, the personal 
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representative encouraged Kristie Madsen to get a second court-ordered DNA 
test rather than relying on the non-court-ordered test results. As was her 
tactical and strategic right, she elected to proceed with the non-court-ordered 
test results. (She knew that those results indicated paternity and she did not 
know what a new court-ordered DNA test would say. Also, it would likely 
be a little less expensive to simply subpoena a foundation witness from the 
outpatient laboratory to give an evidentiary foundation for the existing test 
results rather than opening Kory Pasquin's grave and obtaining a court-
ordered test. Also, the opening of Kory Pasquin's grave to obtain a court-
ordered test would probably upset the family, something that the personal 
representative was also sensitive to and happy to avoid if at all feasible.) 
At that point, it was a rather simple matter for Karly Madsen to simply 
secure a trial date and subpoena a foundation witness. Inexplicably, no such 
witness was subpoenaed, further reducing legal fees over what they would 
have been had one been subpoenaed. None of this was novel, complex, or 
time-consuming, and could all have been easily done for well-under $5,000. 
When the "Final Judgement" erroneously awarded one-half of the 
estate to Karly Madsen, and when Karly Madsen resisted efforts to correct 
that obvious error (and the probate judge also failed to honor the estate's 
objection and correct the obvious error), it was reasonable and prudent for the 
estate to duly appeal that final judgment. Karly Madsen finally conceded that 
point, and so she is not entitled to that portion of the $41,212.50 expended in 
securing that erroneous order. As long as there was going to be an appeal, 
there was also a good faith basis to appeal the decision to give the kind of 
deference to a non-court-ordered test that is reserved in the statute for a court-
ordered test and to appeal the decision by the trial judge to initially indicate 
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he was going to require a foundation witness from the outpatient lab and to 
then decide against that requirement when Karly Madsen couldn't produce 
one. Of all of the issues, only the issue over the $41,212.50 remains, since 
Karly Madsen finally abandoned her efforts to hang-on to half of the estate 
and also stipulated to court-ordered DNA testing which could be done 
utilizing Kody Marion's DNA and the DNA already at the University of Utah 
belonging to Kory Pasquin. This would not only determine the issue of Kody 
Marion's paternity, but, in the even that it found paternity as to him, it would 
also moot all of the lingering factual and evidentiary issues surrounding the 
non-court-ordered DNA test. It did just that and those issues were settled. 
In light of all of this, detailed trial court findings of fact are needed. 
CONCLUSION 
A reversal of the $41,212.50 attorney's fee award as having no basis in 
statute will leave that much more property for the minor children who are the 
heirs. To the extent that the appellate court concludes it has a basis in statute, 
the fee award should be reversed and remanded for the entry of findings of 
fact that are sufficiently detailed and that include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose to the appellate court the steps by which the probate court applied, 
analyzed, and then resolved eachpne of the^qur requirements that are set 
forth in Matter of the Estffle c/OuAjlO P.2jjl 282 (Utah App. 1992). 
DATED THIS y /DAY OF JUNE, i001. 
RO^EElW^OPIER 
Attorney for Candance M. Souter, 
Personal Representative, Estate of Kory Pasquin 
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Addendum 
UCA Sec. 75-2-109(1992) 
UCA Sec. 75-2-114(1998) 
UCA Sec 78-45a (1994) 
UCA Sec 78-45a (1997) 
INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND WILLS 75-2-109 
75-2-107. Kindred of half blood. 
Relatives of the half blood inherit the same share they would inherit if they 
were of the whole blood. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-107, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, § 3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
"Of the blood." and had taken by inheritance property belong-
Phrase "of the blood" under former succes- ing to a deceased son, such property was prop-
sion statute included the half blood as well as erly distributed among his half brothers and 
the whole blood, and excluded only those who sisters and their descendants, as well as 
had none of the blood of the ancestor from brothers and sisters of the whole blood. Gard-
whom the estate came; where a mother died ner's Estate v. Gardner, 42 Utah 40,129 P. 360 
leaving children as the issue of two marriages, (1912). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Descent and inheritance as between kindred of whole and 
Distribution § 54. half blood, 47 A.L.R.4th 561. 
C.J.S. — 26A C.J.S. Descent and Distribu- Key Numbers. — Descent and Distribution 
tion § 36. «=» 35. 
A.L.R. — Descent and distribution: rights of 
75-2-108. Afterborn heirs. 
Relatives of the decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter 
inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-108, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, § 3. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Descent and constitutes sufficient testamentary reference 
Distribution §§ 94 to 96. to, or evidence of contemplation of, heir to ren-
C.J.S. — 26A C.J.S. Descent and Distribu- der statute inapplicable, 83 A.L.R.4th 779. 
tion § 29. Key Numbers. — Descent and Distribution 
A.L.R. — Pretermitted heir statutes: what «= 27. 
75-2-109. Meaning of child and related terms. 
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child 
must be established to determine succession by, through, or from a person: 
(1) An adopted person is the child of an adopting parent and not of the 
natural or previously-adopting parents except that adoption of a child by 
the spouse of a natural or previously-adopting parent has no effect on the 
relationship between the child and that natural or previously-adopting 
parent. 
(2) In cases not covered by Subsection (1), a person born out of wedlock 
is a child of the mother. That person is also a child of the father, if: 
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(a) The natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony be-
fore or after the birth of the child, even though the attempted mar-
riage is void; or 
(b) The paternity is established by an adjudication before the 
death of the father or is established thereafter by clear and convinc-
ing proof, except that the paternity established under this subsection 
is ineffective to qualify the father or his kindred to inherit from or 
through the child unless the father has openly treated the child as his 
and has not refused to support the child. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-109, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, § 3; 1977, ch. 194, § 5; 1992, 
ch. 30, § 153. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, revised the sub-
section designations by deleting "(1)" from the 
beginning and substituting number designa-
tions for lower-case letters and made other sty-
listic changes throughout the section. 
Editorial Board Comment. — The defini-
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Acknowledgment by father. 
Adopted children. 
Burden of proof. 
Conflict of laws. 
Issue of illegitimate. 
Right of illegitimate to inherit. 
Constitutionality. 
This section, which permits a mother to in-
herit from her illegitimate child under all cir-
cumstances but requires a father to meet addi-
tional criteria by demonstrating that he has 
openly treated the child as his own and has not 
refused to support the child before he may in-
herit, does not violate constitutional due pro-
cess and equal rights provisions. Scheller v. 
Pessetto, 783 P.2d 70 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Acknowledgment by father. 
What acts amounted to acknowledgment 
contemplated by former statute permitting in-
heritance by illegitimates if acknowledged by 
father depended upon facts and circumstances 
of each particular case. Rohwer v. District 
Court, 41 Utah 279, 125 P. 671 (1912); Harri-
son v. Harker, 44 Utah 541, 142 P. 716 (1914). 
Adopted children. 
Under former succession statute, "issue" was 
held not to include adopted children with re-
sult that they could not inherit through their 
adoptive parents. In re Harrington's Estate, 96 
Utah 252, 85 P.2d 630, 120 A.L.R. 830 (1938). 
However, in a subsequent case under the same 
statute the court, without referring to the Har-
tion of "child" and "parent" in § 75-1-201 in-
corporates the meanings established by this 
section, thus extending them for all purposes of 
the Code. See § 75-2-803 for the definition of 
"spouse" for purposes of intestate succession. 
Cross-References. — Filing notice of claim 
of paternity, § 78-30-4.8. 
Marriage in belief that former spouse was 
dead or divorced, issue legitimate, § 30-1-3. 
rington case, held that an adopted child could 
inherit in a dual capacity, that is from both 
natural and adopting parents. In re Benner's 
Estate, 109 Utah 172,166 P.2d 257 (1946). In a 
still later case, the court declined to overrule 
Harrington and held that adopted children did 
not inherit from their adoptive parents' rela-
tives. In re Smith's Estate, 7 Utah 2d 405, 326 
P.2d 400 (1958). 
Inter vivos trust, created in 1956, naming 
issue of settlor's two sons as beneficiaries, did 
not include an adopted son since an adopted 
child could not inherit from parents of his 
adoptive parents; and the settlor, by using the 
term "issue," indicated that he did not intend 
to include adopted children as beneficiaries. 
Makoff v. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797 (Utah 1974) 
(decided under former Probate Code). 
Burden of proof. 
Illegitimate child claiming as heir under for-
mer acknowledgment statute had burden of 
proving natural parentage and unambiguous 
acknowledgment by deceased. In re Roberts' 
Estate, 69 Utah 548, 256 P. 1068 (1927); In re 
Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 P.2d 230 
(1931). 
Conflict of laws. 
Under former Probate Code, issue of illegiti-
mate child whose domicile was in Illinois and 
who under Illinois law could not inherit prop-
erty from father's line due to lack of later mar-
riage between mother and father could not in-
herit from father's relative in Utah despite fact 
that had the domicile of the purported heirs 
been Utah, the issue would have taken under 
Utah law; if the law of the domicile found a 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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enacted by Laws 1975, ch. 150, § 3, relating to 
dower and curtesy abolished, and enacts the 
present section, effective July 1, 1 998. 
75-2-114. Parent and child relationship. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), for purposes of intestate 
succession by, through, or from a person, an individual is the child of the 
individual's natural parents, regardless of their marital s tatus. The parent anc 
child relationship may be established as provided in Sections 78-45a-7 
78-45a-10, and Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity. 
(2) An adopted individual is the child of the adopting parent or parents anc 
not of the natural parents, but adoption of a child by the spouse of eithei 
natural parent has no effect on: 
(a) the relationship between the child and tha t natural parent; or 
(b) the right of the child or a descendant of the child to inherit from oi 
through the other natural parent. 
(3) Inheritance from or through a child by either natural parent or his 
kindred is precluded unless that natural parent has openly treated the child ai 
his, and has not refused to support the child. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-114, enacted by L. enacted by Laws 1983, ch. 226, § 1, relating tc 
1998, ch. 39, § 22. person related to decedent through two lines o; 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws relationship, and enacts the present section 
1998, ch. 39, § 22 repeals former § 75-2-114, as effective July 1, 1998. 
PART 2 
ELECTIVE SHARE OF SURVIVING SPOUSE 
75-2-201. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Decedent's nonprobate transfers to others," as used in sections 
other than Section 75-2-205, means the amounts tha t are included in the 
augmented estate under Section 75-2-205. 
(2) "Fractional interest in property held in joint tenancy with the righl 
of survivorship," whether the fractional interest is unilaterally severable 
or not, means the fraction, the numerator of which is one and t h | 
denominator of which, if the decedent was a joint tenant, is one plus the 
number of joint tenants who survive the decedent and which, if the 
decedent was not a joint tenant, is the number of joint tenants. 
(3) "Marriage," as it relates to a transfer by the decedent during 
marriage, means any marriage of the decedent to the decedent's surviving 
spouse. 
(4) "Nonadverse party" means a person who does not have a substant ia 
beneficial interest in the t rust or other property arrangement that would 
be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of the power that the 
person possesses respecting the t rust or other property arrangement. A 
person having a general power of appointment over property is considered 
to have a beneficial interest in the property. 
(5) "Power" or "power of appointment" includes a power to designate thj 
beneficiary of a beneficiary designation. 
(6) "Presently exercisable general power of appointment" means 8 
power of appointment under which, at the time in question, the decedent 
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person shall mail a copy of the affidavit and a copy of the pleading 01 
stipulation to the Office of the Attorney General, Child Suppon 
Division. 
(iii) If notice is not given in accordance with this subsection, the 
office is not bound by any decision, judgment, agreement, or compro 
mise rendered in the action. 
(c) If IV-D services have been or are being provided, that person shall 
join the office as a party to the action, or mail or deliver a written request 
to the Office of the Attorney General, Child Support Division asking the 
office to join as a party to the action. A copy of that request, along with 
proof of service, shall be filed with the court. The office shall be repre-
sented as provided in Subsection (l)(b). 
(3) Neither the attorney general nor the county attorney represents or has 
an attorney-client relationship with the obligee or the obligor in carrying out 
the duties under this chapter. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 9; 1975, ch. 96, 
§ 23; 1977, ch. 145, § 11; 1982, ch. 63, § 2; 
1989, ch. 62, § 23; 1990, ch. 183, § 59; 1994, 
ch. 140, § 15; 1995, ch. 258, § 15. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective May 2, 1994, rewrote Subsec-
tion (2)(a) which read "A person may not com-
mence any action or file a pleading to establish 
or modify a support obligation or to recover 
support due or owing, whether under this chap-
ter or any other applicable statute, without 
filing an affidavit with the court at the time the 
action is commenced or the pleading is filed 
stating whether public assistance has been or is 
being provided on behalf of a dependent child of 
the person commencing the action or filing the 
pleading"; added the designation for Subsection 
(2Kb) and the second sentence in the subsec-
tion; redesignated former Subsection (2)(b) as 
Subsection (2)(c) and added the language be-
Action for reimbursement. 
— Collateral estoppel. 
The trial court properly denied mother's re-
quest for reimbursement of past child support 
under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, find-
ing that she had made statements and took 
actions that led the father to conclude that she 
ginning "or mail or deliver" at the end of the 
first sentence and inserted the second sentence 
therein; deleted former Subsection (3) which 
read "As used in this section 'office' means the 
Office of Recovery Services within the Depart-
ment of Human Services"; and added Subsec-
tion (3). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995, 
substituted "child support services have been 
or are being provided under Part IV of the 
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C, Section 601 et 
seq." for "public assistance has been or is being 
provided" in Subsection (2)(b)(i) and (2)(b)(ii); 
added "of the Attorney General, Child Support 
Division" at the end of Subsection (2)(b)(ii) and 
in Subsection (2)(c); added Subsection 
(2)(bXiii); substituted "IV-D services have been 
or are" for "public assistance has been or is" in 
Subsection (2)(c); and made numerous stylistic 
changes. 
wanted nothing to do with him and didn't want 
his support, that it was reasonable for the 
father to rely on her statements and actions, 
and that, in reliance on her statements and 
actions, the father had married and incurred 
additional expenses. State, Dep't of Human 
Servs. ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 262 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 21 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
CHAPTER 45a 
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 
Section Section 
78-45a-2. Determination of paternity — 78-45a-7. Authority for genetic testing. 
Effect — Enforcement. 78-45a-10. Effect of genetic test results. 
78-45a-5. Remedies. 78-45a-10.5. Visitation rights of father. 
78-45a-l. Obligations of the father. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
45a-2 JUDICIAL CODE 262 
45a-2. Determination of paternity — Effect — Enforce-
ment. 
) Paternity may be determined upon: 
(a) the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the public 
authority chargeable by law with the support of the child; or 
(b) a voluntary declaration of paternity executed in accordance with 
Chapter 45e, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act. 
) If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to 
laws of this state or any other state, the liabilities of the father may be 
reed in the same or other proceedings by: 
(a) the mother, child, or the public authority that has furnished or may 
furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, 
necessary support, or funeral expenses; and 
(b) other persons including private agencies to the extent that the;7 
lave furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, edu-
ction, necessary support, or funeral expenses. 
tory: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2; 1990, ch. tion (1Kb), and designated the second sentence 
23; 1994, ch. 127, § 2. as Subsection (2), making related stylistic 
'ndment Notes. — The 1994 amend- changes and inserting "or any other state" in 
effective May 2, 1994, designated the the introductory language 
ntence as Subsection (1), adding Subsec-
5a-5. Remedies. 
The district court has jurisdiction of an action to establish paternity. All 
lies for enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confine-
for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses for 
nate children shall apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify 
ike a judgment for future education and necessary support. All remedies 
Title 77, Chapter 31, Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 
ailable for enforcement of duties of support under this act. 
a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and 
e Department of Human Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee 
in its own behalf, pursuant to the provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
enforce that right of support against the obligor. 
(b) The provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, apply in all actions by the 
partment. 
c) Whenever the department commences an action under this chapter, 
shall be the duty of the attorney general or the county attorney of the 
mty where the obligee resides to represent the department. Neither the 
orney general nor the county attorney represents or has an attorney-
mt relationship with the obligee or the obligor, in carrying out his 
ponsibilities under this chapter. 
he court may enter an order awarding costs, attorney fees, and witness 
the manner prescribed by Section 30-3-3 upon a judgment or acknowl-
it of paternity. 
he provisions of Rule 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, apply to 
ty actions commenced under this chapter. 
y\ L. 1965, ch. 158, § 5; 1975, ch. 96, ment, effective July 1, 1992, in Subsection (1), 
0, ch. 183, § 60; 1992, ch. 160, § 2; divided the former first sentence into two sen-
137, § 16; 1994, ch. 140, § 16. tences, substituted "action to establish pater-
ment Notes. — The 1992 amend- nity" for "action under this act" at the end of the 
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present first sentence, and added the title and The 1993 amendment, effective May 3,19J 
chapter citation to the reference in the last deleted the (3) designation formerly before t 
sentence; in Subsection (2), substituted the present last sentence in Subsection (2) a 
reference to Title 62A, Chapter 11 for "Chapter added present Subsection (3). 
45b of this title"in the first and second sen- The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,191 
tences; designated the former last sentence of subdivided Subsection (2); substituted "eh* 
Subsection (2) as Subsection (3) and substi- terw for "act" in the first sentence and added t 
tuted "the department commences an action second sentence in Subsection (2)(c); add 
under this act" for "a court action is commenced Subsection (4); and made stylistic changes, 
by the state Department of Human Services" in Meaning of "this act.* — The phrase "tl 
that subsection; and made stylistic changes act" in Subsection (1) refers to Laws 1965, < 
throughout the section. 158, which enacted §§ 78-45a-l to 78-45a-l' 
78-45a-7. Authority for genetic testing. 
(1) Upon motion of any party to the action, made at a time so as not to del; 
the proceedings unduly, the court shall order the mother, the child, and ti 
alleged father to submit to genetic testing. 
(2) The court may, upon its own initiative or upon request made by or < 
behalf of any person whose blood is involved, order the mother, the child, ai 
the alleged father to submit to genetic testing. 
(3) If any party refuses to submit to those tests, the court may resolve t] 
question of paternity against that party, or may enforce its order if the righ 
of others and the interests of justice so require. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 7; 1992, ch. tence into two sentences, reversing their ore1 
160, § 3. and substituting "genetic testing" for "bio 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- tests" in both subsections and "request" j 
ment, effective July 1, 1992, added the subsec- "suggestion" in Subsection (2); and made styl 
tion designations; divided the former first sen- tic changes throughout the section. 
78-45a-10. Effect of genetic test results, 
(1) If the court finds that the conclusions of all experts, as disclosed by t] 
evidence based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the father 
the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. 
(2) If the experts conclude that the genetic tests show the possibility of tl 
alleged father's paternity, admission of that evidence is within the discretion 
the court. 
(3) (a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if genel 
testing results in a paternity index of at least 100. 
(b) A presumption under this subsection may be rebutted in an appi 
priate action only by clear and convincing evidence. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), the court may receive tes 
mony and genetic test results from genetic testing experts and othe 
involved in conducting the genetic tests in the form of an affidavit. 
(b) If any party objects to the court's receipt of the testimony or te 
results in affidavit form, that party may file a written objection with t] 
court. The objection shall be filed within 30 days after service of t] 
written test results on that party. Failure to timely file an objection und 
this subsection constitutes a waiver of that objection. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 10; 1992, ch. (1) and (2), respectively; deleted the forn 
160, § 4. second sentence which read: "If the expe: 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- disagree in their findings or conclusions, t 
ment, effective July 1, 1992, designated the question shall be submitted upon all the e 
former first and third sentences as Subsections dence"; substituted "genetic tests" for "blc 
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ists,* deleted "depending upon the infrequency stylistic change in Subsection (2); and added 
r
 the blood type" from the end, and made a Subsections (3) and (4). 
8-45a-10.5. Visitation rights of father. 
(1) If the court determines that the alleged father is the father, it may upon 
s own motion or upon motion of the father, order visitation rights in 
xordance with Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37 as it considers appropriate 
ider the circumstances. 
(2) Visitation rights may not be granted to a father if the child has been 
bsequently adopted. 
listory: C. 1953, 78-45a-10.5, enacted by came effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to 
1994, ch. 29, § 1. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 29 be-
CHAPTER 45c 
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY 
JURISDICTION 
ion Section 
5c-8. Misconduct of petitioner as ba- 78-45c-15. Filing foreign decree — Effect 
sis for refusing jurisdiction — — Enforcement — Award of 
Notice to another jurisdiction expenses. 
— Ordering petitioner to ap-
pear in other court or to re-
turn child — Awarding costs. 
45c-l. Purposes — Construction. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ted in Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 
i Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
JEL — Home state jurisdiction of court napping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS 
§ 3(aXD of the Uniform Child Custody § 1738A(cX2XA), 6 A.L.R.5th 1. 
liction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kid-
t5c-2. Definitions. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS parental rights in, and obligations to, child was 
not custody issue under this chapter. T.B. v. 
ly proceeding. M.M.J., 278 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
ly proceeding. Cited in Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 
itary termination of adoptive father's (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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(4) (a) The advisory committee shall review the child support guidelines tc 
ensure their application results in the determination of appropriate chile 
support award amounts. 
(b) The committee shall report to the Legislative Judiciary Interiir 
Committee on or before October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or before 
October 1 of every fourth year subsequently. 
(c) The committee's report shall include recommendations of the major 
ity of the committee, as well as specific recommendations of individua 
members of the committee. 
(5) (a) (i) Members who are not government employees shall receive nc 
compensation or benefits for their services, but may receive per dien 
and expenses incurred in the performance of the member's officia 
duties at the rates established by the Division of Finance unde] 
Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(ii) Members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for theii 
service, 
(b) (i) State government officer and employee members who do no 
receive salary, per diem, or expenses from their agency for theii 
service may receive per diem and expenses incurred in the perfor 
mance of their official duties from the committee at the rates estab 
lished by the Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 anc 
63A-3-107. 
(ii) State government officer and employee members may decline t< 
receive per diem and expenses for their service. 
(6) Staff for the committee shall be provided from the existing budgets of th< 
Department of Human Services. 
(7) The committee ceases to exist no later than the date the subsequen 
committee under this section is appointed. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.13, enacted by L. Subsections (l)(a) and (1Kb); added new Sut 
1989, ch. 214, § 15; 1990, ch. 183, § 58; 1994, sections (l)(d) and (l)(e), renumbering accord 
ch. 118, § 14; 1996, ch. 243, § 195; 1997, ch. ingly; substituted "three" for "five" in Subsec 
233, § 1. tion (l)(f); and deleted "and the Judicia 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- Council" after "Department of Human Services 
ment, effective May 5, 1997, substituted "one in Subsection (6). 
representative" for "two representatives" in 
78-45-7.22. Social security number in court records. 
The social security number of any individual who is subject to a suppor 
order shall be placed in the records relating to the matter. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.22, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 235 
1997, ch. 232, § 73. § 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997 
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J-45a-2. Determination of paternity — Effect — Enforce-
ment. 
1) Paternity may be determined upon: 
(a) the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the Office of 
Recovery Services; or 
(b) a voluntary declaration of paternity executed in accordance with 
Title 78, Chapter 45e, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act. 
2) If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to 
laws of this state or any other state, the liabilities of the father may be 
3rced in the same or other proceedings by: 
(a) the mother, child, the Office of Recovery Services, or the public 
authority that has furnished or may furnish the reasonable expenses of 
pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral ex-
penses; and 
(b) other persons including private agencies to the extent that they 
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, edu-
cation, necessary support, or funeral expenses. 
) An adjudication of paternity or a voluntary declaration executed in 
rdance with Title 78, Chapter 45e, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act, 
I be filed with the state registrar in accordance with Section 26-2-5. 
I A party to an action under this chapter has a continuing obligation to 
the court informed of the party's current address. 
tory: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2; 1990, ch. of Recovery Services* for "public authority 
23; 1994, ch. 127, § 2; 1997, ch. 232, chargeable by law with the support of the child" 
in Subsection (l)(a); added "the Office of Recov-
endment Notes. — The 1997 amend- ery Services" in Subsection (2)(a); and added 
effective July 1, 1997 substituted "Office Subsections (3) and (4). 
5a-5. Remedies. 
The district court has jurisdiction of an action to establish paternity. All 
lies for enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confine-
for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses for 
nate children shall apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify 
oke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All remedies 
Title 78, Chapter 45f, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, are 
ble for enforcement of duties of support under this chapter. 
(a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and 
ie state may proceed on behalf of the obligee or in its own behalf, 
irsuant to the provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services, to 
iforce that right of support against the obligor. 
(b) The provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services, apply in 
[ actions by the state. 
(c) Whenever the state commences an action under this chapter, it shall 
the duty of the attorney general or the county attorney of the county 
lere the obligee resides to represent the state. Neither the attorney 
neral nor the county attorney represents or has an attorney-client 
ationship with the obligee or the obligor, in carrying out his responsi-
ities under this chapter. 
Ipon motion by a party, the court shall issue a temporary order in a 
ty action to require the payment of child support pending a determi-
Df paternity if there is clear and convincing evidence of paternity in the 
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form of genetic test results under Section 78-45a-7 or 78-45a-10, or ot 
evidence. 
(4) The court may enter an order awarding costs, attorney fees, and witr: 
fees in the manner prescribed by Section 30-3-3 upon a judgment or acknc 
edgment of paternity. 
(5) Rule 55, Default Judgment, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, appliei 
paternity actions commenced under this chapter. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 5; 1975, ch. 96, port Act" for "Title 77, Chapter 31, Unl 
§ 24; 1990, ch. 183, § 60; 1992, ch. 160, § 2; Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act" 
1993, ch. 137, § 16; 1994, ch. 140, § 16; 1997, substituted "chapter" for "act"; in Subse< 
ch. 232, § 75. (2)(a) substituted "state" for "Departmer 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- Human Services"; substituted "state" for 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, in the last sen- partment" throughout Subsections (2Kb) 
tence of Subsection (1) substituted "Title 78, (2)(c); added Subsection (3) and made rel 
Chapter 45f, Uniform Interstate Family Sup- redesignations; and made stylistic change! 
78-45a-6.5. Standard of proof. 
The standard of proof in a trial to determine paternity is "by a prepom 
ance of the evidence." 
History: C. 1953, 78-45a-6.5, enacted by ment, effective July 1, 1997, rewrote the 
L. 1988, ch. 93, § 1; 1997, ch. 232, § 76. tion. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
78-45a-7. Authority for genetic testing. 
(1) Upon motion of any party to the action, made at a time so as not to di 
the proceedings unduly, the court shall order the mother, the child, and 
alleged father to submit to genetic testing if the request is supported I 
sworn statement by the requesting party: 
(a) alleging paternity and setting forth facts establishing a reason, 
possibility of the requisite sexual contact between the parties; or 
(b) denying paternity and setting forth facts establishing a reason 
possibility of the nonexistence of sexual contact between the parties. 
(2) The court may, upon its own initiative, order the mother, the child, 
the alleged father to submit to genetic testing. 
(3) (a) The court shall order genetic testing: 
(i) of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by accredita 
bodies designated by the federal Secretary of Health and Hui 
Services; and 
(ii) to be performed by a laboratory approved by such an acci 
tation body, 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (6), the cost of genetic testing s 
be paid by the party who requested it or shared between the parti 
requested by the court, subject to recoupment against the party 
challenges the existence or nonexistence of paternity if the result of 
genetic test is contrary to the position of the challenger. 
(4) Upon request by a party, a court may order a second genetic test 
complies with Subsection (3) if paid for in advance by the requesting party 
requested within 15 days of the result of the first genetic test being sent tc 
last-known address on file under Section 78-45a-2. 
(5) If any party refuses to submit to genetic testing, the court may res 
the question of paternity against that party, or may enforce its order ii 
rights of others and the interests of justice so require. 
8-45a-8 JUDICIAL CODE 128 
(6) The office may request genetic testing under this section and shall pay 
r genetic testing it requests subject to recoupment as provided in Section 
>A-11-304.1. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 7; 1992, ch. Subsection (1); added Subsections (l)(a) and 
0, § 3; 1997, ch. 232, § 77. (1Kb); deleted "or upon request made by or on 
Vmendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- behalf of any person whose blood is involved" 
nt, effective July 1, 1997 added "if the re- after "initiative" in Subsection (2); added Sub-
sst is supported by a sworn statement by the sections (3), (4), and (6) and made related 
[uesting party" in the opening paragraph of redesignations; and made stylistic changes. 
t-45a-8, 78-45a-9. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1997, ch. 232, § 141 re- selection and compensation of experts, effective 
Is §§ 78-45a-8 and 78-45a-9, as enacted by July 1, 1997. 
/s 1965, ch. 158, §§ 8 and 9, relating to 
-45a-10. Effect of genetic test results. 
1) Genetic test results shall be admissible as evidence of paternity without 
need for foundation testimony or other proof of authenticity or accuracy if: 
(a) of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by accreditation bodies 
designated by the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services; 
(b) performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body; 
and 
(c) not objected to with particularity and in writing within 15 days after 
the written test results being sent to the parties. 
) (a) Upon a motion of a party, a court may receive testimony from genetic 
testing experts and others involved in conducting the genetic tests if the 
testimony: 
(i) is based on a genetic test performed in accordance with Subsec-
tion 78-45a-7(3)(a) or 78-45a-7(4); and 
(ii) is useful to the court in determining paternity. 
(b) Unless a party objects with particularity and in writing within 15 
days after the written test results are sent to the last-known address of 
that party on file under Section 78-45a-2, testimony received under 
Subsection (2)(a) shall be in affidavit form. 
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if genetic 
esting results in a paternity index of at least 150. 
(b) A presumption under Subsection (3)(a) may only be rebutted by a 
econd genetic test: 
(i) that complies with Subsection 78-45a-7(4); and 
(ii) results in an exclusion. 
If a presumption of paternity established under Subsection (1) is not 
ted by a second genetic test under Subsection (2), the court shall issue an 
establishing paternity. 
Bills for pregnancy, childbirth, and genetic testing are admissible as 
ice without requiring third-party foundation testimony and shall consti-
irima facie evidence of amounts incurred for such services or for testing 
lalf of the child. 
>ry: C. 1953, 78-45a-10, enacted by L. as amended by Laws 1992, ch. 160, § 4, pre-
h. 232, § 78. scribing the effect of genetic test results, and 
als and Reenactments. — Laws enacts the present section, effective July 1, 
l. 232, § 78 repeals former § 78-45a-10, 1997. 
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78-45a-11.5. Social security number in court records. 
The social security number of any individual who is subject to a paternit; 
determination shall be placed in the records relating to the matter. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45a-11.5, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232 
L. 1997, ch. 232, § 79. § 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997 
CHAPTER 45e 
VOLUNTARY DECLARATION OF 
PATERNITY 
Section Section 
78-45e-2. Voluntary declaration of pater- 78-45e-3. Requirements for filing. 
nity. 78-45e-4. Rescission of the declaration. 
78-45e-2. Voluntary declaration of paternity. 
(1) (a) A voluntary declaration of paternity filed in compliance with this 
chapter establishes a father-child relationship identical to the relationship 
established when a child is born to persons married to each other. 
(b) When a voluntary declaration of paternity is filed, the liabilities oi 
the father include, but are not limited to, the reasonable expense of the 
mother's pregnancy and confinement and for the education, necessary 
support, and any funeral expenses for the child. 
(c) When a father voluntarily declares paternity, his liability for past 
amounts due is limited to a period of four years immediately preceding the 
date that the voluntary declaration of paternity was filed. 
(2) When a voluntary declaration of paternity is filed it shall be recognized 
as a basis for a child support order without any further requirement or 
proceeding regarding the establishment of paternity. 
(3) The voluntary declaration of paternity may be completed and signed any 
time after the birth of the child. A voluntary declaration of paternity may not 
be executed or filed after consent to or relinquishment for adoption has been 
signed. 
(4) The voluntary declaration of paternity shall become an amendment to 
the original birth certificate. The original certificate and the declaration shall 
be marked so as to be distinguishable. The declaration may be included as part 
of subsequently issued certified copies of the birth certificate. Alternatively, 
electronically issued copies of a certificate may reflect the amended informa-
tion and the date of amendment only. 
(5) The voluntary declaration of paternity shall be in the form prescribed by 
the state registrar of vital statistics and shall be accompanied with an 
explanation of the alternatives to, the legal consequences of, and the rights and 
responsibilities that arise from signing the declaration. 
(6) The social security number of any person who is subject to a voluntary 
declaration of paternity shall be placed in the records relating to the matter. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45e-2, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1997 added "and shall be 
1994, ch. 127, § 4; 1995, ch. 258, § 16; 1997, accompanied..;' in Subsection (5) and added 
ch. 232, § 80. Subsection (6). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
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